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Since 2007 financial markets worldwide have been suffering from a confidence 
crisis which has emphasised the discussion about the Credit Rating Agencies 
(CRAs) and the opportunity to enhance the competition in such a highly 
concentrated sector. The reform process, carried out by European and American 
regulators, aims at reinforcing the external surveillance on CRAs and, at the 
same time, improving the governance of the agencies in terms of board 
composition, internal control systems and disclosure. After an in-depth and 
comparative analysis of the legal rules, the article shows and discusses the 
results of an investigation focalised on the contents and quality of the disclosure 
of 32 selected CRAs, with the purpose of foreseeing the future competitive 
conditions in the European rating market, since the new European Regulation 
should break the oligopoly of the largest American agencies by introducing 
minimal governance requirements.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are specialised in evaluating the credit risk: they issue opinions on the 
creditworthiness of private and public issuers and the reliability of financial instruments. A rating is an 
opinion on the probability that a loan or another financial instrument will not be entirely and timely repaid 
and will fall into default (Amtenbrink & De Haan, 2009; European Commission, 2006). 
 
Since ratings steer the choices of many investors, a large debate has risen about the ratings’ quality, the 
independence of CRAs from rated issuers and the opportunity to enhance the competition in such a highly 
concentrated sector, where almost all of the ratings are issued by three CRAs (Standard & Poor’s Ratings 
Services, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings). 
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This topic has attracted the attention of policy makers and scholars, who have stressed the potential 
conflicts of interests within the issuer-pay business model, the most adopted by CRAs, as well as the need 
for improvement in the CRAs’ governance, rating processes and transparency. 
 
The subprime crisis has brought CRAs under fire; as a matter of fact, it has accelerated the reform process 
that some countries were already carrying out. Indeed, CRAs have certainly played a role in the diffusion 
of the crisis, due to the investment grade ratings they have assigned to issuers (like Lehman Brothers, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG) that very soon became insolvent. Moreover, the CRAs have often 
evaluated structured financial instruments in the creation of which they had taken part, arousing 
perplexity on their objectivity in the rating judgement. In their efforts to get over the crisis, European and 
American regulators have introduced and enhanced respectively the external surveillance on CRAs; 
besides, both of them have imposed rules on internal control, independence, management of conflict of 
interest and disclosure. 
 
In the light of the above-mentioned premises, this article has two purposes, based on different but 
integrated research phases. First of all, we summarise some weaknesses in rating sector stressed in the 
business economics literature (section 2), as a starting point to comparatively analyse the contents of the 
reforms as concerns external surveillance, control in corporate governance and internal control (section 
3). After that, our research acquires an empirical nature: we show and discuss the results of an 
investigation aimed at verifying the contents and quality of the disclosure divulged by some selected 
CRAs, in order to identify both the deficiencies and the best practices internationally adopted (section 4) 
and to advance some considerations on the future evolution of competition in the rating sector (section 5).  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Up to now, the studies on CRAs have mainly adopted a financial point of view (Ashcraft & Schuermann, 
2008; Coval, Jurek, & Stafford, 2009; Hull, 2009; Lim, 2008; Yay, 2010). Due to the economic crisis 
started in 2007 (Buiter, 2007; Crouchy, Jarrow, & Turnbull, 2008; Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Felton & 
Reinhart, 2008, 2009; Friedland, 2009; Kolb, 2010; Masera, 2009) some scholars have also underlined the 
most important weaknesses of the rating sector, linked to the CRAs’ organisational structure, their 
functioning, the relationships with the issuers of financial instruments, the questionable quality of ratings, 
the low competition and the deficiencies in surveillance by public authorities. Most of these problems can 
be ascribed to the lack of mandatory provisions specifically addressed to CRAs, which has characterised 
the international context until the second half of this decade. 
 
An extensively debated aspect concerns CRAs’ business models. In offering their service of credit 
worthiness evaluation, CRAs help issuers meet investors. Ratings are frequently based on information – 
even sensitive and confidential – that CRAs raise from the issuers, thanks to their cooperation (European 
Commission, 2006): CRAs rarely use only public information. Since ratings help reduce information 
asymmetry between the issuer and the investor (IOSCO, 2008; Listokin & Taibleson, 2010), they are 
usually sold by CRAs as economic services. Based on the part who requires and pays for the assessment 
service, we can distinguish between two main business models (Justensen, 2009; Mathis, McAndrews, & 
Rochet, 2009; Richardson & White, 2009). 
 
The issuer-pay model is the most utilised one. Its name stresses the issuer’s active role in the rating 
process: indeed, the issuer applies to one or more CRAs to be comprehensively evaluated as a borrower 
(“issuer rating”) or to obtain the assessment of a specific financial instrument he intends to offer to the 
market (“instrument rating”). As a compensation for the evaluation service, the issuer pays fees to the 
CRA (usually on an annual basis), and these payments originate the CRA’s revenues: there is 
consequently a clear conflict of interests for CRAs (Buiter, 2007).The ratings paid by an issuer are 
normally made public as a signal of the reliability of the issuer or the financial instrument. An investment 
grade rating (that means a good rating) reassures the investors about the probability to obtain interests and 
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the redemption of their money; from the issuer’s point of view, it helps collect money and pay low 
interest rates. Summarising, ratings contribute to the definition of credit terms. 
 
The virtuous working of the issuer-pay model should guarantee effective rating processes, thanks to the 
mentioned cooperation between the CRA and the issuer in phase of information collection and analysis. It 
is in the issuer’s interest to be transparent, supplying the CRA with all the information necessary for a 
satisfactory rating. Nevertheless, the issuer-pay model determines two dangerous risks: the risk that the 
CRA is too indulgent towards the issuer that pays for the rating, and the risk that the issuer hides or 
manipulates information to obtain a better rating. 
 
Unfortunately, these risks have come true in recent years, causing the issue of poor-quality and untruthful 
ratings, used by the financial players in a very undiscriminating and uncritical way. After the investors 
have discovered this situation, their mistrust in CRAs started to increase.It is difficult to oppose the 
effects produced by the large use of the issuer-pay model, because it characterises the three biggest CRAs 
dominating the sector worldwide. Only few small CRAs operate with a different business model, defined 
investor-pay or subscriber-pay model: in the investor-pay model, the investor requires and pays for the 
rating in order to found investments on a professional and objective opinion concerning the issuer’s 
creditworthiness. Anyway, the investor-pay model makes it impossible for the CRA to obtain confidential 
information on the issuer evaluated, since there is no direct relationship between these two parts. As a 
consequence, the ratings paid by the investor depend exclusively on public information. 
 
Another problem regards the validity of ratings in time. In fact a rating may become misleading for the 
market if the CRA that has issued it does not periodically monitor or lately updates it, staying in a state of 
“inertia” (Conti, 2010; Matthews, 2009). For example, the three largest CRAs have maintained 
investment grade ratings for companies like Lehman Brothers and AIG until few days before their 
collapses. 
 
Similarly, the CRAs have neglected to update and modify their rating methodologies, adopting the 
traditional ones for long to assess also the sophisticated structured financial instruments (Brancaccio & 
Fontana, 2011; Danielsson, 2008).Sometimes the CRAs have even utilised wrong economic forecasts 
(Bawden, 2008) and overestimated the international economic perspectives, transferring this excessive 
confidence into the ratings; then, they have maintained their ratings at an investment grade to prevent 
panic and to avoid worsening the delicate economic situation.  
 
A large part of criticism towards CRAs is also due to their involvement as consultants in 
structuring the sophisticated financial instruments they have afterwards positively assessed 
(Mariano, 2008; Portes, 2008). On the one hand, this kind of behaviour has favoured the “rating 
shopping” phenomenon (Portes, 2008; Spreta & Veldkamp, 2009), on the other hand it has 
deceived the market in relation to the reliability of financial instruments deriving from the 
securatisation of subprime loans. In point of fact, such instruments were so complex that 
investors could not easily understand and evaluate them on their own, so they relied on ratings 
issued by CRAs (Hull, 2009). Unfortunately, these ratings were usually the result of the 
cooperation between a CRA and the issuer, who had made use of rating analysts’ help to 
structure new instruments in the highest compliance with the CRA’s rating methodologies 
(Buiter, 2007; Fender & Mitchell, 2005; Financial Stability Forum, 2008; Financial Services 
Authority, 2009; Conti, 2010). In other terms, many issuers of structured products have looked 
for the best evaluation by means of a sort of preventive rating shopping at one or more CRAs, 
which used to operate as consultants during the phase of structuring; after that, the same CRAs 
had no interest in withdrawing their own original opinion, so they used to assign and maintain 
high ratings for such instruments. What is more, these CRAs were the only keepers of the 
information necessary to assess those structured products, due to their internal complexity. Being 
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the other CRAs operating in the sector much smaller, they were unable to issue unsolicited and 
therefore uncompensated ratings, which could have been more neutral. 
 
Low competition in the rating market has also concerned policy makers and academicians. Indeed, the 
rating sector is highly concentrated, given that Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch detain together 
more than 90% of the market all over the world (SEC, 2009).This oligopolistic structure discourages the 
entry of new CRAs, which would have difficulty in achieving a sufficient market share to survive 
economically. The three largest CRAs’ reputation is a barrier to entry into a sector dominated by the 
issuer-pay model, where the issuers usually choose their raters.  
 
High concentration is also due to the difficulty for small CRAs to issue unsolicited ratings based only on 
public information. Effective competition lacking, the quality of ratings issued by the largest CRAs has 
undoubtedly decreased. Nevertheless, the entry of new CRAs into the sector is not a sure solution to all 
the problems: indeed, small CRAs could be conciliatory towards the issuers, at least at first, in order to 
rapidly reach a satisfactory position in the market (Conti, 2010; Katz, Salinas, & Stephanou, 2009). 
 
All the phenomena we have described derived, among other things, from the wide trust in market self-
regulation, which should have guaranteed the automatic punishment of unfair behaviour. The mechanisms 
of self-regulation have failed in recent years, because of the grave lack of transparency on CRAs’ activity 
and governance. Among other things, this situation is attributable to the nature of unlisted companies that 
characterises even the largest CRAs, which have been free from mandatory rules on disclosure for long 
time: CRAs were not accountable to the markets, financial regulators, governments or global financial 
entities (Stone, 2008). 
 
In spite of the signals that a strong change was indispensable, regulators have delayed their intervention, 
relying on the respect for the IOSCO principles and code of conduct regarding CRAs’ activities.However, 
the economic meltdown has imposed substantial modifications, determining the issue of mandatory 
provisions finalised at: identifying specific authorities for the rating sector, charged with powers of 
surveillance and intervention towards the CRAs, and obliging the CRAs to establish control bodies and to 
activate internal procedures of corporate governance and control based on independence, prevention of 
conflicts of interests and transparency.  
 
3. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS ON RATING AND CRAS 
This section describes the most important laws and self-regulations that should be a turning point for the 
rating sector in this century, influencing CRAs’ formal recognition, corporate governance and 
functioning. First of all, we consider the IOSCO voluntary provisions, which are addressed to the CRAs 
all over the world; then, we analyse the legislations adopted by the EU and the USA. Our study intends to 
identify recommendations and rules concerning CRAs’ corporate governance, external and internal 
control and disclosure to surveillance authorities and markets, as a premise to the following empirical 
research. 
 
a) The IOSCO principles and code of conduct  
IOSCO was the first international organisation to publish rules of conduct for CRAs. Such provisions are 
contained in the “IOSCO statement of principles regarding the activities of credit rating agencies” 
(September 2003) and the “Code of conduct fundamentals for credit rating agencies” (December 2004, 
revised in May 2008): these documents should improve the protection of investors that rely on rating, on 
the one hand, and correctness, efficiency and transparency in the financial markets where the CRAs 
operate, on the other hand. 
 
The IOSCO provisions are voluntary and flexible in their implementation. CRAs can adopt them 
independently of their own country of origin; nevertheless, if national laws and regulations exist, they 
prevail on the IOSCO provisions. Even if the IOSCO provisions are not mandatory, IOSCO recommends 
that CRAs include these measures in their individual codes of conduct. More exactly, each CRA should 
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publish its code of conduct on its website, explaining if and where the code deviates from the IOSCO 
model and how it permits all the same the achievement of IOSCO’s purposes (“comply or explain” 
principle). The IOSCO provisions concern two main aspects: the internal control and the stakeholder 
communication (Table 1). IOSCO does not provide any measures instead about corporate governance and 
supervision by external authorities. 
Table 1: Summary of the IOSCO Principles and Code of Conduct 
Internal control External communication 
• Prohibition of consulting services on financial instruments to 
be rated  
• Management and disclosure of conflicts of interests 
• Analyst rotation 
• Analysts’ compensation independence from CRA revenues 
• Analyst independence from any other businesses of the CRA 
• Rigour of rating methodologies and models 
• Adequacy of human and financial resources to rating 
activities 
• Reliability of information used in rating processes 
• Conservation and treatment of documents 
• Confidential information treatment 
• Periodic review of rating methodologies and models 
• Introduction of a review function; where feasible and 
appropriate, it should be independent 
• Introduction of an independent compliance function 
• List of ancillary services 
• Description of rating methodologies, hypotheses and models 
• Disclosure of modifications to rating methodologies, 
hypotheses and models 
• Periodical communication of historical default rates of CRA 
rating categories 
• List of the key clients originating at least 10% of the CRA 
total revenue 
• Information on compensation policies 
• Description of actual and potential conflicts of interests 
 
b) The EU legislation 
The UE legislation on CRAs consists of several directives, regulations and guidelines.Directive 
2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) states that if an issuer decides to 
allow a CRA to access to inside information, the CRA would owe a duty of confidentiality. The 
correlated Directive 2003/125/EC explains that credit ratings do not constitute investment 
recommendations; nevertheless, this Directive stipulates that CRAs should consider adopting internal 
policies and procedures designed to ensure that credit ratings are fairly presented and that they are 
objective, independent and accurate. Moreover, it states that CRAs disclose any significant interests or 
conflicts of interests concerning the financial instruments or the issuers to which their credit ratings 
relate.The Capital Requirement Directive (CRD, comprising Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC) 
introduces the definition of External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI), consequently to Basel Accords. 
This is the first time that the European Commission is specifically interested in a particular type of CRAs, 
the activity of which makes it necessary to implement an external preventive surveillance finalised at the 
official recognition of the ECAI status. 
 
The need for mandatory rules valid for all the CRAs operating within the EU has stimulated the European 
Parliament and the Council to adopt Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, which is currently under review as 
for the articles concerning competent authorities in order to reconcile the Regulation with the reformed 
structure of the European financial control authorities (ESMA in particular). 
 
The Regulation is intended to modify a sector in which self-discipline prevails, also due to an express 
choice of the European Commission that recommended CRAs to adopt the IOSCO voluntary code of 
conduct (Communication 2006/C 59/02).Considering the specificity and importance of the ECAI 
discipline and Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, we describe their main contents paying attention to 
control procedures and external communication. 
 
The ECAI discipline 
The importance of ECAIs is due to Basel II Accords, in consequence of which ECAIs’ credit ratings can 
be used by banks as a basis for capital requirement calculations in the Standardised Approach and, with 
reference only to securitisation exposures, in the Internal Ratings-Based Approach. 
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For our purposes, it is convenient to summarise the requirements a CRA must possess to be recognised as 
an ECAI according to the following provisions: 
 
 Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, as amended by Directives 2009/27/ EC, 2009/83/ EC 
and 2009/111/ EC (in course of transposition into the national laws by the EU Member 
States); 
 the CEBS1 Guidelines of 2006, which are currently under review to guarantee their 
consistency with the mentioned directives2. 
 
These rules arrange a system of external and internal controls on ECAIs and impose transparency; this is 
manifest from the recognition procedure, introduced in 2006 and recently modified in order to expedite 
the checks by the national competent authority, if the CRA has already been registered in accordance with 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009. 
 
The procedure of ECAI recognition stresses the key role of national bank authorities as external 
supervisors on ECAIs. The national bank authorities have the power to require information and they 
operate with the support of CEBS, the EU body responsible for issuing guidelines (regulatory function). 
A CRA is recognised as an ECAI within the boundaries of the EU-country the bank authority of which 
has received, assessed and accepted the application. Applicants can be CRAs themselves, but also other 
institutions (usually banks) that intend to use an ECAI’s ratings for risk-weighting purposes. 
 
The application is presented to the national competent authority, which must verify the compliance of 
some elements with specific criteria (“direct recognition”): therefore the competent authority activates 
external preventive controls on eligible ECAIs’ structures and processes. Anyway, if the CRA has already 
obtained the ECAI status in another Member State, the competent authority is not obliged to carry out its 
own direct recognition process: it can confirm the ECAI status conferred by the authority of the other EU-
country (indirect recognition), thanks to a provision oriented to encourage cost reduction and procedure 
simplification. In this sense, CEBS has recommended that the competent authorities of all the Member 
States adopt the suggested procedures in order to reach the greatest possible convergence in the approach 
and in the assessment within the EU. 
 
The application should be supported by comprehensive, transparent and appropriately documentation so 
that the competent authority can evaluate the adequacy of the CRA to be recognised as an ECAI. 
Information should include a general introduction of the CRA and all the details useful for the verification 
of the technical criteria set out in the CRD with reference to both rating methodology (objectivity, 
independence, on-going review, transparency and disclosure) and individual credit assessments (rating 
credibility and market acceptance, transparency and disclosure of individual credit assessments)3. 
 
Table 2 summarises the most important rules contained in the CEBS Guidelines of 2006 concerning the 
external supervision, the internal control and the disclosure of the ECAIs. No provision exists in relation 
to their corporate governance. 
                                                 
1 CEBS (Committee of European Banking Supervisors) has been replaced by EBA (European Banking 
Authority) since 1 January 2011. 
2 In March 2010 CEBS issued a consultation paper to collect suggestions and opinions about the draft revised 
Guidelines on the recognition of ECAIs, based on the modifications imposed by Directives 2009/27/ EC, 2009/83/ 
EC and 2009/111/ EC. 
3 Thanks to the amendments to the CRD, the technical criteria concerning the rating methodology are considered 
implicitly verified if the CRA has already been registered in compliance with Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009. 
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Table 2: Summary of ECAI Provisions  
External supervision Internal control External communication 
• Regulatory function: assigned to 
CEBS/EBA 
• Inspection function: assigned to each 
national competent authority 
• Power to require information: assigned 
to each national competent authority 
• Management and disclosure of 
conflicts of interests 
• Analysts’ compensation independence 
from ECAI’s revenues 
• Analyst independence from any other 
businesses of the ECAI 
• Rigour of rating methodologies and 
models 
• Adequacy of human and financial 
resources to rating activities 
• Introduction of a review function 
• Confidential information to the 
competent authority as concerns the 
ECAI’s organisational structure, the 
revenue from the key clients and the 
financial statements of the past three 
years. The dissemination to the public 
of the mentioned information is subject 
to the prior consent of the ECAI.  
• Description of rating methodologies, 
hypotheses and models 
 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 
The ECAI discipline does not exhaust the EU provisions on rating, because not all the CRAs apply for 
and obtain the status of ECAI. Moreover, each EU Member State could enforce the ECAI discipline in a 
different way from the others, due to the national validity of the ECAI recognition. The delicate situation 
of the financial markets during the world economic crisis has stressed the need for a significant reform of 
the rating sector, in order to restore reliable guarantees for the investors. Thus, the EU regulators have 
set a coordinated system of mandatory rules oriented to: charge selected authorities with tasks of 
preventive and on-going, direct or indirect supervision on CRAs; affect the CRAs’ bodies and activities 
of governance and control and the CRAs’ external communication, in the interest of the investors and the 
other stakeholders; enhance the international uniformity as regards the operational functioning of CRAs 
and the supervision on the part of the competent authorities.  
 
In order to fulfil these purposes, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have 
adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, which intends: first, to ensure that CRAs avoid (or manage) 
conflicts of interest in the rating process; second, to improve the quality of the rating methodologies and 
the quality of ratings; third, to increase transparency by setting disclosure obligations for CRAs; fourth, to 
ensure an efficient registration and surveillance framework, avoiding “forum shopping” and regulatory 
arbitrage between EU jurisdictions4.The Regulation applies to credit ratings issued by CRAs registered in 
the Community and which are disclosed publicly or distributed by subscription.  
 
The Regulation sets a complex control system on CRAs, structured in three levels; each level includes 
various processes and it is more pervasive than the previous one for the CRA organisation.The first level 
regards the external control procedures: these are currently co-ordinated by CESR/ESMA5 and carried out 
by the competent authorities of the EU Member States, which deliberate on the CRA initial registration 
and on-going permanence in the rating sector within the EU borders. 
 
The second level concerns the control procedures implicit in corporate governance: these belong to the 
CRA’s board of directors or supervisory board6, particularly to the independent members, who shall be at 
least one third of the board, shall have sufficient expertise in financial services and structured instruments 
and shall receive a compensation not linked to the CRA business performance. 
 
The third level refers to the internal control procedures that aim at: avoiding conflicts of interest; 
verifying the quality of information used in the rating process; reviewing methodologies, models and key 
                                                 
4 Regards the context and the objectives of Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, please refer to the Explanatory 
Memorandum in the Proposal for the Regulation, document COM(2008) 704 final. 
5 ESMA (European Securities and Markets Authority) has replaced CESR (Committee of European Securities 
Regulators) since 1 January 2011. 
6 The competent board depends on the corporate governance model adopted by the CRA within the limits 
established in the national laws it is governed by. 
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rating assumptions (“review function”), adopting an independent approach; monitoring the compliance of 
the CRA and its staff with the obligations set by the Regulation (“compliance function”), by means of an 
independent department.The three levels of control are strictly interrelated and participate together in 
developing an effective and transparent corporate governance in CRAs, so that the investors’ expectations 
for CRA proper behaviour and management can be satisfied. In particular, the Regulation subordinates 
the CRA registration by the competent authority to the observance of operational requirements that the 
compliance officer, the analysts in charge of the review and the directors they refer to shall monitor. 
 
Moreover, the Regulation emphasises the importance of communication for maintaining effective 
relationships between the CRA and its external stakeholders. In this sense each CRA shall disseminate: 
1. Information to prove its independence, disclosing the ancillary services to rating activities it has 
performed, the amount of revenue it derives from its key clients, its actual and potential conflicts 
of interest and its compensation policies; 
2. Information on ratings and the rating process (description of methodologies, models and 
assumptions, as well as their modifications; historical default rates; etc.); 
3. An annual “Transparency Report” with details on the CRA’s legal structure and ownership, 
corporate governance, allocation of staff, internal control mechanisms and revenue composition 
(distinguishing between fees from credit rating and non-credit rating activities). 
 
Table 3 pays attention to the main contents of Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 in the fields of external 
supervision, control in corporate governance, internal control and external communication.  
 
Table 3: Summary of Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 
 
External supervision Control in corporate 
governance  
Internal control External communication 
• Regulatory function: 
assigned to CESR/ESMA 
• Inspection function: 
assigned to each national 
competent authority 
• Power to require 
information: assigned to 
each national competent 
authority 
• Appointment of 
independent members in the 
CRA board of directors or 
supervisory board (at least 
one third, but no less than 
two) 
• Independent members’ 
compensation not linked to 
the CRA’s business 
performance  
• Independent members’ term 
of office: pre-agreed, not 
exceeding five years and not 
renewable. 
• Sufficient expertise in 
financial services by the 
majority of the board of 
directors or supervisory 
board, including the 
independent members.  
• In-depth knowledge and 
experience of structured 
finance by at least one 
independent member and 
one other member of the 
board. 
 
• Prohibition of consulting 
services on financial 
instruments to be rated  
• Management and disclosure 
of conflicts of interests 
• Analyst rotation 
• Analysts’ compensation 
independence from CRA’s 
revenues 
• Analyst independence from 
any other businesses of the 
CRA 
• Rigour of rating 
methodologies and models 
• Adequacy of human and 
financial resources to rating 
activities 
• Reliability of information 
used in rating processes 
• Conservation and treatment 
of documents 
• Confidential information 
treatment 
• Periodic review of rating 
methodologies and models 
• Introduction of an 
independent review function
• Introduction of an 
independent compliance 
function 
• Minimum mandatory 
disclosure, contained in the 
annual “Transparency 
Report” published on the 
CRA website 
• List of ancillary services 
• Description of rating 
methodologies, hypotheses 
and models 
• Disclosure of modifications 
to rating methodologies, 
hypotheses and models 
• Six-month communication 
of historical default rates of 
CRA rating categories 
• List of the key clients 
originating at least 5% of 
the CRA total revenue 
• Information on 
compensation policies 
• Description of actual and 
potential conflicts of 
interests 
• Description of internal 
control for the prevention 
and management of 
conflicts of interests. 
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c) The US provisions 
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRARA) of 29 September 2006 was the first important 
legislation for the rating sector in the United States. The Congress published the CRARA in reply to the 
corporate scandals that had originated perplexities on the CRAs’ activity at the beginning of the 
millennium. In this respect the CRARA pursued a better quality of the rating processes in order to protect 
the investors and the public interest by enhancing accountability, transparency and competition in the 
sector. 
 
Until that moment CRAs were used to operate with an actual autonomy, because their activity was 
usually considered as a form of the freedom of the press established by the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution. Nevertheless, in 1975 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began to exercise its 
supervision on CRAs, a rather formal than substantial control consisting in managing the procedure for 
the recognition of CRAs as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs) by means 
of “no-action letters”. 
 
The reform of 2006 was an attempt to reduce the weaknesses of the rating sector, which were among the 
others:  
 The formal role of the SEC;  
 The circularity of the recognition process based on the no-action letters, which privileged the 
largest CRAs with good reputation in the investment community (Coskun, 2008) and made it 
more and more difficult for the other CRAs to obtain the NRSRO status;  
 The lack of mandatory rules concerning the CRAs’ duties of transparency towards the SEC 
and the investors. 
 
The CRARA has strengthened the role of the SEC in the NRSRO recognition process, also stressing its 
regulatory function and its powers to require information and to investigate. In particular, CRAs applying 
for the NRSRO status must fill in the “Form NRSRO”, giving information to the SEC on their legal 
status, organisation and affiliates, credit rating process and free dissemination, conflicts of interests, code 
of ethics, credit analysts, analyst supervisors and the compliance officer, their total and median annual 
compensation, and the largest users of credit rating services by the amount of net revenue earned from 
them by the CRA. If the SEC recognises the CRA as a NRSRO, it shall require the public dissemination 
of all non-confidential information contained in the Form NRSRO, for example by means of the CRA 
website. After the recognition, the NRSRO shall complete the same Form for the SEC and the investors 
as an annual certification at the end of each year. 
 
In July 2010 a section of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act introduced 
important amendments to the CRARA, including the establishment of a new external supervisor on the 
NRSROs (the Office of Credit Ratings, within the SEC) and the request for independent directors in the 
NRSROs’ boards. The independent directors are charged with tasks of control in corporate governance; 
they shall be at least one half of the board (and not fewer than two) and their remuneration shall not be 
linked to the business performance of the CRA. A portion of the independent directors shall include users 
of ratings issued by a NRSRO. 
 
Each NRSRO shall also have an internal control system focalised on the rating policies, procedures and 
methodologies. The NRSRO shall write out an annual report on its internal control system clarifying the 
responsibilities of management in introducing, maintaining and assessing the internal control structure; 
moreover, the CEO shall make an annual attestation to the effectiveness of the NRSRO’s internal 
controls. 
 
The US law obliges the NRSROs to implement preventive controls (oriented to avoid the misuse of non-
public information and to manage any conflicts of interest), to periodically review rating methodologies 
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and models, and to monitor compliance with policies, procedures and rules. As concerns compliance 
control, the law also requires each NRSRO to establish an independent function. 
Table 4 combines the most important provisions on NRSROs from the CRARA of 2006 and the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010 with reference to external oversight, control in corporate governance, internal control 
and external disclosure. 
Table 4: Summary of the CRARA and the Dodd-Frank Act 
External supervision Control in corporate 
governance  
Internal control External communication 
• Regulatory function: 
assigned to SEC 
• Inspection function: 
assigned to SEC 
• Power to require 
information: assigned to 
SEC 
• Appointment of 
independent members in the 
NRSRO board of directors 
(at least one half, but no less 
than two) 
• Appointment of users of 
credit ratings issued by a 
NRSRO as independent 
directors 
• Independent members’ 
compensation not linked to 
the business performance of 
the NRSRO 
• Independent members’ term 
of office: pre-agreed, not 
exceeding five years and not 
renewable 
• Disclosure of consulting 
services on financial 
instruments to be rated  
• Management and disclosure 
of conflicts of interests 
• Analyst rotation 
• Analyst independence from 
any other businesses of the 
NRSRO 
• Rigour of rating 
methodologies and models 
• Reliability of information 
used in rating processes 
• Confidential information 
treatment 
• Periodic review of rating 
methodologies and models 
• Introduction of an 
independent compliance 
officer, whose 
compensation shall be 
independent of the 
NRSRO’s business 
performance 
• Minimum mandatory 
disclosure, contained in the 
annual “Form NRSRO” 
published on the NRSRO 
website 
• Annual report on the 
internal control system and 
its effectiveness  
• Description of rating 
methodologies, hypotheses 
and models 
• List of the 20 largest clients 
selected on the basis of the 
revenue for the NRSRO 
• Information on 
compensation policies 
• Description of actual and 
potential conflicts of 
interests 
• Description of internal 
control for the prevention 
and management of 
conflicts of interests. 
 
 
4. THE GOVERNANCE OF A SIGNIFICANT CLUSTER OF CRAS: METHODOLOGY 
& RESULTS 
 
The purpose of this survey is to express an opinion about the current level of compliance of a significant 
cluster of CRAs with Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, as regards their control systems and 
voluntary/mandatory disclosure. In fact, today the European Regulation contains the best practices for the 
financial market protection, since it generally provides stricter requirements than the other regulations in 
force. 
 
The new Regulation will offer a great opportunity to some CRAs to enter in the European rating market 
without excessive costs of adaptation. Vice versa, for some agencies the Regulation requirements should 
be an entry barrier because of compliance efforts. Consistently with the theoretical considerations we 
expressed in the first part of the paper, this survey aims at identifying which types of CRAs are the most 
inclined to European registration in relation to the current compliance of their governance with the 
Regulation requirements. 
 
The results will pave the way towards an assessment of the future evolution of competition in the rating 
sector, since the European Regulation should break the oligopoly of the largest American agencies by 
introducing minimal governance requirements and enhancing rating comparability.  
The survey is organised in three stages: 
1. The selection of a significant cluster of CRAs; 
2. The specification of the items to be examined in the light of Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, and 
the relevant data collection; 
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3. Results and discussion. 
 
CRA selection  
At present a complete and reliable schedule of CRAs acting at European and international level does not 
exist, except for the SEC’s list of NRSROs. Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, imposing a CRAs central 
register, will contribute to the improvement of transparency in this sphere.  
 
Therefore, this survey uses a cluster of CRAs already investigated in two previous studies, published in 
2009 by IOSCO’s Technical Committee (A Review of Implementation of the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for CRAs) and by CESR (Report by CESR on Compliance of EU based Credit Rating 
Agencies with the IOSCO Code of Conduct) about the compliance with the IOSCO Code. In the opinion 
of IOSCO’s Technical Committee and CESR, the agencies selected in their studies were potentially the 
most qualified for the registration in accordance with the European Regulation, which was still in 
progress at the time of the researches.  
 
In our survey, we examine 32 agencies, 18 of which have their seat in a European Member State.To 
correctly analyse the governance of a CRA, it is necessary to consider the economic and juridical 
characteristics of its own country as regards:  
 The prevailing legal system (common law or civil law);  
 The development of stock markets and the relevant type of corporate control (market-oriented 
systems or insider systems);  
 The rules concerning the appointment of corporate governance boards and their administrative and 
supervisory functions (one-tier models, two-tier models, two-part models).  
 
These factors can be ties or opportunities that, combined with the agencies’ autonomy as regards their 
ownership, governance and disclosure choices, cause a variety of situations that can be classified only in 
theory. For this reason, the national peculiarities of governance should not be neglected, even if the 
harmonisation of rules is a desirable step towards uniformity in rating quality. 
Table 5 stresses some significant differences among the 32 CRAs here analysed, with reference to their 
ownership, country legal system and stock market development, which determine the specific 
administrative and supervisory system of each CRA.  
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Table 5: List of agencies 
Agency NRSRO 
ECAI 
Seat Corporate governance 
system in force in the 
country (*) 




AM Best  
Company  NRSRO USA One-tier Parent company  
Austin Ratings   Brazil Two-part Austin Holding  
DBRS NRSRO ECAI Canada One-tier   
Egan Jones NRSRO USA One-tier   
Fedafin   Switzerland One-tier   
Fitch Rating  NRSRO ECAI USA One-tier 
Fitch Group - 
Fimalac Euronext Paris 
JCR  NRSRO ECAI Japan 
One-tier 
Two-part   
LACE Financial  NRSRO USA One-tier   
LF Rating  Brazil Two-part   
Moody’s Investors Service  NRSRO ECAI USA One-tier 
Moody’s 
Corporation NYSE 
Rating and Investment Information NRSRO ECAI Japan 
One-tier 
Two-part   
Realpoint  NRSRO USA One-tier Morningstar  
SR Ratings  Brazil Two-part   
Standard & Poor’s Financial 
Services 
NRSRO 
ECAI USA One-tier Mc Graw Hill NYSE 





Assekurata Assekuranz Rating 
Agentur  ECAI Germany Two-tier   
National Credit Rating Agency  Bulgaria One-tier Two-tier   
Capital Intelligence  Cyprus One-tier   




Capp & Capp Value  
Coface  ECAI France One-tier Two-tier Natixis Euronext Paris 





ECRAI  Slovakia Two-tier   
Euler Hermes Rating   Germany Two-tier  Allianz Euronext Paris 
European Rating Agency  Slovakia Two-tier  
European Rating 
Agency  




Cerved Group  
MAR Rating   Germany Two-tier   
PSR Rating   Germany Two-tier   
RS Rating Services  Germany Two-tier  Financial Services  
Svensk  
Kommun Rating   Sweden One-tier   
The Economist Intelligence Unit  Great Britain One-tier 
The Economist 
Group  
UC  Sweden One-tier Parent company  
URA Rating Agentur  ECAI Germany Two-tier   
(*) In the two-part system the Annual General Meeting (AGM) appoints both the Board of Directors and the Board of Auditors. 
In the two-tier system the AGM appoints the Supervisory Board, which in turn appoints a separate Management Board. In the 
one-tier system the AGM appoints the Board of Directors, which appoints the Management Control Committee from among its 
members. 
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It is important to underline that some of the agencies we investigate in this research are recognised as 
NRSROs and/or ECAIs. The contemporary presence of both the status for many extra-EU agencies draws 
attention to their global activity7; vice versa, European agencies are characterised by a more local activity. 
The 32 agencies have been further subdivided in clusters on the basis of the regulation governing their 
activity and leaving their geographical location out of consideration (Table 6):  
 10 agencies are NRSROs (also considering in this cluster the agencies doubly recognised as 
NRSRO and ECAI. Indeed, NRSRO recognition requirements are more restrictive than ECAI 
recognition ones);  
 5 agencies are ECAIs (excluding the agencies recognised as NRSROs and ECAIs at the same 
time); 
 17 agencies currently have no recognition. 
 
Finally, each cluster have been further subdivided in relation to the adoption of a code of ethics inspired 
by IOSCO Code of conduct. In our opinion this classification can be useful to a qualitative evaluation 
about the agencies’ level of compliance with the European Regulation. Table 6 shows the classification of 
the agencies used for the survey. 
 
Table 6: Classification of agencies 
 With Code  Without Code  Total 
NRSROs 10 - 10 
ECAIs 5 - 5 
Others 11 6 17 




In the next step of the survey we identified the items to be verified. Since Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 
requires what we can currently consider the international best practice about credit rating and CRAs’ 
governance, we selected its articles on control in corporate governance, internal control and disclosure, in 
accordance with the model proposed in the first part of the paper: these articles express the items for our 
empirical verification. 
 
We listed all the items in specific Excel worksheets, where we recorded all the results for each CRA. The 
results are summarised in this article by means of tables where data are processed. For data collection, we 
made use of codes of conduct, policies and all other information and documents about the agencies’ 
governance available on the CRAs’ web sites from September to November 2010. 
 
We are conscious that voluntary disclosure could not fairly represent the governance of an agency: the 
absence of non-compulsory information does not necessarily involve the inexistence of the fact. 
Nevertheless, the present trend of rules suggests a progressive international harmonization in regard to 
external and internal control. In future, transparency in communication could be a key factor in 
establishing competitive advantage. In the light of the general observance of common requirements 
(aimed at guaranteeing independent, comparable and high-quality ratings), the excellence in the rating 
sector will depend on the ability of each CRA to appreciate the relationships with its stakeholders through 
a constant and transparent communication. 
 
Data analysis and results 
In this section we describe the findings concerning control in corporate governance (Table 7), internal 
control (Table 8) and disclosure (Table 9). 
                                                 
7 Moody’s, S&P and Fitch are recognised as ECAI in Bulgaria, Italy, France, Cyprus, Slovakia, Sweden and 
Great Britain; DBRS in France and Sweden; JCR and R&I in France. 
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Table 7: Corporate governance control (independent members) 
NRSROs  ECAIs  Others with Code Others without Code  




- - - - - - - - 
Remuneration policy  - - - - - - - - 
Term of office  - - - - - - - - 
Sufficient expertise in 
financial services  - - - - - - - - 
 
 
Table 7 emphasises an absolute absence of information about independent board members. This situation 
could signify a lack of interest towards this subject, probably due to the absence of a previous regulation 
and specific obligations for CRAs. 
Table 8: Internal control system 
NRSROs  ECAIs  Others with Code Others without Code  
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Prohibition of consulting 
services on financial 
instruments to be rated 
7 70.0 3 60.0 10 90.9 - - 
Conflict of interests 10 100.0 5 100.0 9 81.8 - - 




10 100.0 5 100.0 9 81.8 - - 
Analyst independence 
from any other agency 
activities 
10 100.0 5 100.0 11 100.0 1 16.7 
Scrupulousness of 
methodologies and models  10 100.0 5 100.0 10 90.9 1 16.7 
Adequacy of human and 
financial resources to 
rating activities 
7 70.0 5 100.0 6 54.5 - - 
Reliability of information 
used for assessment  10 100.0 5 100.0 10 90.9 1 16.7 
Records of methodologies 
and dialogues with rated 
entity  
10 100.0 5 100.0 10 90.9 - - 
Confidential information 
treatment 10 100.0 5 100.0 9 81.8 - - 
Periodic review of 
methodologies and models 10 100.0 5 100.0 7 63.6 1 16.7 
Review function  8 (°) 80.0 1 20.0 5 (°°) 45.5 - - 
Compliance function  10 (§) 100.0 5 (^) 100.0 8 (^^) 72.7 - - 
(°) When specified, the review function is assigned to senior managers of great experience (in 4 agencies) or to a credit policy committee 
composed of analysts (in 2 agencies). Out of 8 agencies with a compliance function, 1 also declares the independence of it, while 5 think it is 
useful only in particular hypotheses (depending on the rated financial instrument). 
(§) The 80% of the NRSROs clearly specify the independence of the compliance officer too. 
(^) The compliance function is defined independent in 4 cases. 
(°°) No agency of this cluster with a specific review function states its independence. 
(^^) The function is independent just in 4 cases. 
 
Table 8 points out a greater transparency about internal control, in relation to the prevention of conflicts 
of interest, as well as the review of rating methodologies and models and the compliance control.The 
NRSROs express an high, or total, degree of compliance to the greatest part of the European Regulation’s 
items. Anyway, internal control effectiveness shall be further strengthened by the prohibition of 
consultancy and advisory services to rated entities and by the imposition of analyst rotation. Moreover, 
while all the NRSROs have established a compliance function, the review function has not been activated 
by the entire cluster and, where it exists, it is not always clearly identifiable and independent. 
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The ECAIs are similar to the NRSROs as regards the limits to consultancy and advisory services and 
reinforcement of analysts independence through rotation mechanisms. Although all the ECAIs affirm that 
they periodically review their methodologies, models and rating hypotheses, a specific review function is 
not activated, while the compliance function is always present.  
 
Compared to the NRSROs and the ECAIs, the non-recognised CRAs with a Code of conduct inspired by 
IOSCO Code are less compliant with the European Regulation requirements. Almost all these agencies 
state that they do not carry out consultancy activities and guarantee both the independence of their 
analysts and the quality of ratings (through scrupulous methodologies and use of reliable information). 
Nevertheless they should enhance the management of conflicts of interest, the review activity (through 
the establishment of a suitable function) and the compliance function. 
 
Finally, the non-recognised CRAs without any code of conduct are far from the European Regulation and 
need an in-depth review of their whole internal control system. 
 
Table 9: Disclosure 
NRSROs  ECAIs) Others with Code Others without Code  
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Transparency Report - - -  - - - - 
List of ancillary services 8 80.0 2 40.0 3 27.3 - - 
Description of rating 
methodologies, models 
and hypotheses 
10 100.0 5 100.0 10 90.0 3 50.0 
Disclosure about changes 
in rating methodologies, 
models and hypotheses 
10 100.0 4 80.0 7 63.6 - - 
Six-month data on 
historical default rates - - - - - (*) - - - 
List of clients from which 
the agency obtains more 
than 5% of its total 
revenue 
- - 1 20.0 2 (**) 18.2 - - 
General nature of 
compensation 
arrangements 
9 90.0 5 100.0 8 72.7 - - 
Disclosure about potential 
and actual conflicts of 
interest 
10 100.0 4 80.0 7 63.6 - - 
Disclosure about internal 
control processes to 
prevent and manage 
conflicts of interest  
10 100.0 5 100.0 9 81.8 - - 
(*) 45.5% of agencies inform about rating default rate with one year recurrence.  
(**) 22.3% of agencies inform when a client originates more than 10% of whole agency’s revenue. 
 
Table 9 points out a high degree of compliance with the Regulation as regards the NRSROs, even when 
the results are zeroes, because they depend on a literal interpretation of the items. In actual fact, 70% of 
NRSROs publish historical default rates with a different time interval and commit themselves to 
signalling when at least 10% of revenue rises from one client. Table 10 shows the contents of the 
Transparency report, as required by the European Regulation. 
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Table 10: Transparency report: contents 
NRSROs  ECAIs  Others with Code Others without Code  
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Legal structure and 
ownership 10 100.0 1 20.0 2 18.2 1 16.7 
Internal control system 2 20.0 2 40.0 1 9.1 - - 
Statistics on allocation 
of the staff - - 1 20.0 - - - - 
Record-keeping policy 6 60.0 - - - - - - 
Outcome of the annual 
review of compliance 
function 
1 10.0 - - - - - - 
Management and rating 
analyst rotation 3 30.0 - - - - - - 
Agency revenue 1 10.0 1 20.0 1 9.1 - - 
Governance statement 1 10.0 1 20.0 1 9.1 - - 
 
The Transparency report will also increase the NRSROs’ disclosure, nowadays completely compliant 
with the European Regulation as regards only the information already demanded by NRSRO Form (legal 
structure and ownership). ECAIs’ external communication is similar to NRSROs’ one, except for the list 
of ancillary businesses. Moreover, the European Regulation sets a shorter time interval for the analysis of 
historical default rates, as we have already mentioned above: at the moment 60% of ECAIs give 
information with different recurrence. As concerns the communication about the main clients of the 
agency, please refer to Table 9. Furthermore, the ECAIs show a little degree of compliance with the 
request for mandatory disclosure of the Transparency report (Table 10).  
 
Non-recognised agencies with a code of conduct disclose information about methodologies, models and 
rating hypotheses, independence of analysts’ compensation from agency’s revenue, and conflicts of 
interest and their prevention. Nevertheless the percentages are widely improvable (Table 9). On the 
whole, the comparison with the information requested in the Transparency report underlines the need for 
significant compliance efforts in future (Table 10). 
 
Non-recognised agencies without a code of conduct are almost always reticent and opaque in their 
external communication (Tables 9 and 10).To conclude we can affirm that NRSROs seem to be ready to 
respect the European requirements as regards control in corporate governance (which is not currently 
carried out, but compulsory for NRSRO recognition in the light of 2010 Investor Protection and 
Securities Reform Act), internal control (perfectible in some aspects but amply consonant at present) and 
external communication (making currently confidential information public).  
 
The registration at CESR/ESMA will imply strong compliance efforts for existing ECAIs in relation to 
control in corporate governance. Although the ECAI regulation is less pressing than the American and the 
European Community ones, the agencies have a good level of compliance to Regulation (EC) No. 
1060/2009 with regard to internal control and disclosure.The present affinity between NRSROs and 
ECAIs could be justified by the IOSCO self-regulation: indeed many of the IOSCO Code 
recommendations have been acquired by the European Regulation as mandatory rules. 
 
The importance of self-regulation also appears in the comparison between non-recognised CRAs with a 
code a conduct (whose registration is not precluded) and those without the document and so lacking in 
internal control (whose registration would probably involve unsustainable compliance costs). 
 
Therefore, we can deduce that the agencies currently recognised as NRSROs or ECAIs will be 
able to respect the European Regulation requirements without excessive compliance costs, unlike 
the others. Although the European Regulation aims at increasing competition in the European 
rating market, the biggest American agencies and the locally recognised ones will probably 
continue to dominate.Because of standardisation of minimal requirements in terms of governance 
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and disclosure, we expect that the CRAs will look for different factors for establishing 
competitive advantage, for example the use of better rating methodologies or the improvement of 
stakeholder relationship management through a more transparent communication. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
The analysis of reforms in rating sector points out a progressive harmonisation between the European and 
the American supervision models: this convergence probably accelerated because of the economic crisis, 
which has stressed the risks of a self-regulation system applied to CRAs. International harmonisation of 
rules is based on shared attention to external, internal and corporate governance controls and to the 
disclosure to the stakeholders, with the aim of strengthening agencies’ credibility assuring their 
independence, effectiveness of governance and transparency in both behaviour and communication. Indeed, 
credibility is the most important key factor in competitive advantage; nonetheless, this principle should be 
reconsidered with reference to a rating market dominated by few big players, which are irreplaceable, in 
case of failure, by equally trustworthy competitors8. 
 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, imposing requirements aimed at guaranteeing minimal qualitative 
standards, wishes the maintenance of financial markets stability and, at the same time, the increase of 
competition in rating sector. This consideration led us in our empirical analysis concerning a cluster 
composed of the potentially most qualified CRAs for the Community registration, with the purpose of 
assessing their current compliance with the European requirements and express an opinion about the 
future competition trend in the European rating sector. 
 
The analysis points out differences between agencies actually recognised as NRSRO/ECAI and all the 
others; in fact, the former have a good level of compliance with the European Regulation, while the latter 
have to fill the gap in their control systems. Moreover, the self-regulation appears to be carried out more 
effectively by the agencies already registered (in the United States and Europe), and it seems to be important 
for the promotion of their independence, but inadequate as regards the stakeholder protection. 
 
These reflections induce us to foresee that the future competitive conditions in the European rating market 
will not be very different from the current ones, with a clear predominance of the existing NRSROs. 
Nevertheless we commit ourselves to validate this opinion in the near future, when the list of agencies 
recognised in compliance with the new European Regulation is made public. Furthermore, we could 
develop our research by examining the actual effectiveness of the Regulation through an in-depth study of 
the management of registered agencies and the rating market dynamics. 
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